REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: O CICLO ESTRAL DE BOVINOS LEITEIROS – Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro ANIMAL REPRODUCTION: THE OESTROUS CYCLE OF DAIRY BOVINES -Follicular Development, Corpus Luteum and Stages of Estrus Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 FISIOLOGIA CLÍNICA DO CICLO ESTRAL DE BOVINOS LEITEIROS 1. RESUMO A fêmea bovina apresenta ciclos estrais em intervalos de 19 a 23 dias e estes só são interrompidos durante a gestação ou devido (...) a alguma patologia. O estro é o período de aceitação da cópula e tem uma duração de 8 a 18 horas. Durante o metaestro ocorre a ovulação e se desenvolve o corpo lúteo. O diestro é o estágio mais longo do ciclo e é caracterizado pela presença de um corpo lúteo. Se a gestação não for estabelecida, o endométrio segrega prostaglandina F2α(PGF2α) o que induz a luteólise, reiniciando assim um novo ciclo. 2. EIXO HIPOTÁLAMO-HIPÓFISE-OVÁRIO As hormonas são substâncias produzidas por diferentes células do organismo que exercem funções específicas em outras células (células brancas). Algumas hormonas atuam na mesma célula que a secreta (atividade autocrina), outras nas células vizinhas (atividade parácrina) e outras são transportadas pelo sangue e exercem a sua função em células de outros órgãos (atividade endócrina). Existem outros tipos de hormônios que comunicam a diferentes indivíduos e são conhecidos como feromônios. Os feromônios regulam diferentes funções, entre as quais se destacam as reprodutivas. O hipotálamo encontra-se na base do cérebro, é formado por núcleos pares de neurônios e comunica-se com a hipófise através de um sistema circulatório especializado conhecido como sistema porta-hipotálamo-hipofisário. Os neurônios da área ventromedial e da área pré-óptica do hipotálamo secretam a hormona libertadora das gonadotropinas (GnRH), que por sua vez chega à hipófise através do sistema porta-hipotálamo-hipofisário e estimula a secreção da hormona luteinizante (LH) e da hormona folículo estimulante (FSH). A LH mantém um padrão de secreção paralelo à secreção da GnRH; ou seja, uma parcela de GnRH corresponde a uma parcela de LH, ao contrário da FSH que tem uma produção basal elevada inibida pelo estradiol e inibina, por este motivo, a sua secreção não apresenta um padrão pulsante semelhante à LH. A GnRH tem duas formas de secreção: a primeira é pulsante ou tônica, regulada por estímulos externos (fotoperíodo, bioestimulação, amamentação) e por estímulos internos (metabolitos, hormonas metabólicas, hormonas sexuais); a segunda forma é pré-ovulatória ou cíclica e é estimulada pelos estrogênios durante o estro e inibida pela progesterona. A secreção de alguns hormônios, bem como diversos processos fisiológicos, são sincronizados com a duração do dia e da noite (ritmos endógenos). A luz é percebida pelos fotorreceptores da retina e o sinal luminoso chega à glândula pineal através de conexões neuronais (trato retino-hipotalâmico). Na glândula pineal, o estímulo produzido pela luz inibe a síntese da melatonina. Desta forma, a duração do dia e da noite (fotoperíodo) é registada pelas variações nas concentrações da melatonina. Na vaca, sabe-se que o fotoperíodo influencia alguns processos reprodutivos, embora não seja, em sentido estrito, uma espécie com um padrão reprodutivo sazonal. Os feromônios sexuais são excretados através da urina, fezes e fluidos corporais; eles são percebidos pelo epitélio olfatório e órgão vomeronasal. Posteriormente, algumas vias nervosas, estimulam no hipotálamo a frequência dos pulsos de secreção da GnRH. A exposição a feromonas femininas provoca no macho um aumento na frequência de secreção do LH e isto por sua vez aumenta as concentrações de testosterona. Os feromônios masculinos induzem na fêmea um aumento da frequência de secreção do LH, estimulando o crescimento folicular e a secreção de estradiol. A estimulação sexual provocada pelo macho ou pela fêmea é denominada bioestimulação. As alterações na condição corporal estão positivamente correlacionadas com as concentrações séricas de insulina, fator de crescimento semelhante à insulina tipo I (IGF- I) e leptina. Assim, quanto maior a classificação da condição corporal, maior é a concentração sérica destas hormonas, que atuam como sinais que chegam ao hipotálamo e modificam a frequência de secreção da GnRH. Por exemplo, a transição do anestro para a ciclicidade coincide com um aumento da condição corporal e das concentrações de insulina, IGF- I e leptina (figura 1). Figura 1. A transição do anestro para a ciclicidade coincide com um aumento da condição corporal e das concentrações de insulina, IGF- I e leptina. Estas hormonas atuam como sinais que chegam ao hipotálamo e aumentam a frequência de secreção da GnRH. Fonte: GALINA, et al. 2008. Os estrogênios podem ter um feedback positivo ou negativo sobre a secreção da GnRH, o que depende da fase do ciclo reprodutivo. Em animais pré-púberes e em anestro pós-parto, os estrogênios inibem a secreção de GnRH, mas durante o período de proestro e estro há uma estimulação para a secreção de GnRH. A progesterona reduz a secreção da GnRH, bem como a resposta da hipófise à GnRH, inibindo assim a maturação folicular e a ovulação. Por esta razão, a progesterona foi utilizada com sucesso como contraceptivo em humanos e para o controle artificial da reprodução em animais domésticos (figura 2). Figura 2. Retroalimentação entre o hipotálamo, hipófise e o ovário. A GnRH estimula na hipófise a síntese e secreção de LH e FSH. Na fase pré-púbere e no anestro pós-parto, os estrogênios inibem a secreção de GnRH, enquanto no proestro e estro, estimulam-na. A progesterona inibe a secreção da GnRH e diminui a resposta da hipófise à GnRH. Os estrogênios e a inibina suprimem a secreção de FSH diretamente na hipófise. Fonte: GALINA, et al. 2008. Os neurônios secretores da GnRH não têm receptores para estrogênios nem progesterona, pelo que estas hormonas não têm forma de regular diretamente a secreção da GnRH. Existe um grupo de neurônios hipotalâmicos que exprimem o gene Kiss-1 que codifica o peptídeo kisspeptina. Os neurônios secretores da GnRH têm receptores para este peptídeo, de modo que a kisspeptina fornece a informação aos neurônios secretores da GnRH em relação às concentrações de hormônios sexuais. A kisspeptina é um potente estimulador (secretagogo) da secreção da GnRH e é muito provável que nos próximos anos venha a fazer parte dos recursos hormonais para o controle artificial da reprodução, não só nos bovinos, mas em todas as espécies domésticas. 3. DESENVOLVIMENTO FOLICULAR O ovário é responsável pela produção de ovócitos e pela síntese de hormônios sexuais, estrogênios e progesterona, que promovem e regulam a fertilização do ovócito e a manutenção da gestação. O ovócito encontra-se no interior do folículo ovárico rodeado por células granulosas que participam de forma ativa no seu crescimento e maturação. As experiências in vitro demonstram a dependência dos ovócitos das células da granulosa, assim, quando os ovócitos são induzidos a amadurecer devem estar rodeados por várias camadas de células da granulosa para que este processo seja bem sucedido, caso contrário, não adquirem o potencial para desenvolver um embrião. Embora as células da teca interna não estejam em contato direto com o ovócito, seu papel na maturação deste o exercem mediante a produção de andrógenos, mesmos que são convertidos em estrogênios pelas células da granulosa. Além disso, as células da teca favorecem o estabelecimento da rede capilar que apoia o desenvolvimento folicular. Por outro lado, os novos conhecimentos indicam que o ovócito não é um elemento passivo no desenvolvimento folicular, mas regula a função das células foliculares; o que significa que ele próprio participa na criação de um microambiente ideal para a sua maturação. Além disso, é possível que o ovócito tenha um papel na ativação do desenvolvimento dos folículos primordiais. A fêmea bovina nasce com aproximadamente 200 mil folículos, dos quais muito poucos se ativam e iniciam seu crescimento, e a maior parte deles sofre atresia em diferentes etapas de desenvolvimento. Ao nascimento, os folículos estão na fase mais elementar e são conhecidos como folículos primordiais. Posteriormente estes folículos se ativam e se transformam em folículos primários e secundários; até este momento os folículos não têm antro (etapa pré-antral) e seu desenvolvimento é independente das gonadotropinas. Quando os folículos formam o antro são conhecidos como folículos terciários e seu desenvolvimento é dependente das gonadotropinas (etapa antral). O crescimento folicular no estágio antral ocorre em forma de ondas e cada onda começa com um aumento nos níveis de FSH, o qual promove o crescimento de um grupo de cinco a seis folículos (~4 mm de diâmetro); este processo é conhecido como recrutamento. Subsequentemente, um único folículo continua a crescer (folículo dominante), o que provoca um aumento das concentrações de estrogênios e inibina, uma diminuição das concentrações de FSH e atresia dos folículos subordinados, pois eles dependem totalmente desta hormona, enquanto o folículo dominante continua o seu desenvolvimento estimulado pela LH. O folículo dominante perdura de quatro a seis dias e se não chega a ovular, sofre atresia. Após a atresia do folículo dominante, diminuem-se os níveis de estrogênio e inibina, observa-se um aumento das concentrações de FSH e inicia-se uma nova onda folicular. O folículo dominante que está presente quando o corpo lúteo sofre regressão, continua seu desenvolvimento e ovula, em resposta ao pico pré-ovulatório de LH. Além de promover a liberação do ovócito, a secreção pré-ovulatória de LH regula a formação do corpo lúteo a partir das células foliculares, processo conhecido como luteinização. Durante o ciclo estral são apresentadas de duas a três ondas foliculares. As vacas com três ondas foliculares têm uma fase lútea mais longa e, consequentemente, um ciclo estral mais longo, de 22 a 23 dias; enquanto as vacas com duas ondas apresentam um ciclo estral de 18 a 21 dias. Nas vacas leiteiras, cerca de 70% apresentam duas ondas foliculares, enquanto 30% exibem três ondas (figura 3 e 4). Nas vacas com duas ondas foliculares, o período de dominação folicular é maior do que nas de três ondas. O tempo de dominação influencia o potencial dos ovócitos para desenvolver um embrião viável; assim, a porcentagem de concepção é menor quando ovulam folículos que tiveram mais dias de dominação dos que quando ovulam folículos com menor tempo de dominação (figura 5). Figura 5. O crescimento folicular no estágio antral ocorre na forma de ondas. Cada onda começa com um aumento nas concentrações de FSH, o que promove o recrutamento de cinco a seis folículos (~4 mm de diâmetro). Posteriormente um único folículo continua crescendo (folículo dominante), enquanto seus companheiros (subordinados) sofrem atresia. O folículo dominante perdura de quatro a seis dias e se não chega a ovular, sofre atresia. Após a atresia do folículo dominante observa-se um aumento das concentrações de FSH, iniciando-se uma nova onda folicular. 3.1 Ovulação múltipla Nos últimos anos tem-se observado um aumento na proporção de vacas com ovulação múltipla (20% x 1% em novilhas), o que tem provocado um aumento da proporção de partos gêmeos (8% x 1% em novilhas). A frequência de vacas com ovulação múltipla está associada com a alta produção de leite; de modo que, as vacas que produzem menos de 40 kg mostram 6% de ovulações múltiplas e aquelas que produzem mais de 50 kg alcançam até 50%. A causa deste fenômeno ainda é obscura, contudo, observaram-se diferenças nas concentrações de FSH, de tal forma que as vacas que desenvolvem de dois a três folículos dominantes numa onda folicular, apresentam níveis de FSH mais elevados que as vacas que têm apenas um folículo dominante. Em vacas em lactação, a concentração de progesterona é baixa devido ao aumento do metabolismo hepático, o que aumenta a sua taxa de eliminação. Foi observado que as vacas que tiveram uma fase lútea com níveis de progesterona mais elevados, no ciclo anterior à inseminação, apresentam menos ovulações múltiplas em comparação com as vacas que tiveram níveis de progesterona mais baixos. Propõe-se que as baixas concentrações de progesterona permitam um aumento da frequência de secreção da GnRH e, consequentemente, da LH e da FSH, favorecendo a predominância múltipla e, eventualmente, a ovulação de mais de um folículo. Nos rebanhos leiteiros, as gestações gêmeas não são desejáveis porque aumenta o risco de perda da gestação e, se esta chegar ao término, haverá o risco de perda da gestação e, se esta for concluída, o risco de distorcia é consideravelmente mais elevado (figuras 6, 7, 8 e 9). Figura 6. As baixas concentrações de progesterona sérica nas vacas em lactação permitem um aumento da frequência de secreção da GnRH, bem como o aumento da LH e da FSH. Isto favorece a dominação múltipla e eventualmente a ovulação de mais de um folículo. Esta figura mostra a dominância de dois folículos em cada onda folicular (codominância). Figura 7. Ovários de uma vaca leiteira em diestro com três folículos dominantes. Figura 8. Ovários de uma vaca leiteira com três corpos lúteos. Figura 9. Ovários de uma vaca leiteira com dois corpos hemorrágicos. Fonte: Acervo pessoal do autor. IFPE, 2017-18. 4. DESENVOLVIMENTO E CONTROLE DA FUNÇÃO DO CORPO LÚTEO Quando o folículo dominante completa sua maturação, ele produz níveis de estrogênio suficientes para provocar a liberação máxima da GnRH, o que desencadeia o pico pré-ovulatório da LH. Esta secreção de LH provoca a ovulação e inicia as mudanças para que o folículo se transforme em um corpo lúteo, processo conhecido como luteinização. A luteinização compreende todas as mudanças morfológicas, endócrinas e enzimáticas que ocorrem no folículo ovulatório até que este se transforme num corpo lúteo. O processo de luteinização começa a partir da elevação pré-ovulatória de LH; mesmo antes da ovulação. A luteinização do folículo dominante (≥8 mm de diâmetro) pode ser induzida hormonalmente pela injeção de GnRH ou gonadotropina coriónica humana (hCG). A ovulação ocorre em média 30 horas após o pico pré-ovulatório de LH. A secreção pré-ovulatória de LH desencadeia a liberação de enzimas proteolíticas e de mediadores da inflamação na parede folicular, as quais degradam o tecido conjuntivo e ocasionam morte celular. Posteriormente, a PGF2α induz contrações da teca externa, levando à ruptura folicular e à expulsão do ovócito. Após a ovulação, as células da teca interna e da granulosa migram e distribuem-se nas paredes do folículo. As células da teca interna se diferenciam e se multiplicam em células lúteas pequenas, enquanto que as células da granulosa se hipertrofiam e dão origem às células lúteas grandes. Estas alterações são facilitadas pela ruptura da membrana basal que separa a camada celular da granulosa da teca interna. Em forma paralela começa a formação de uma ampla rede de capilares que se distribuem em todo o corpo lúteo em formação, e chegam a constituir até 20% do volume desta estrutura (figuras 10 e 11). A progesterona é o principal produto de secreção do corpo lúteo. No quinto dia do ciclo estral, as concentrações séricas desta hormona são superiores a 1 ng/ ml, indicando que o corpo lúteo adquiriu a sua plena funcionalidade. A progesterona atua basicamente sobre os órgãos genitais da fêmea, sendo responsável pela preparação do útero para o estabelecimento e manutenção da gestação. Na mucosa do oviduto e do útero, estimula a secreção de substâncias que promovem o desenvolvimento do embrião, até que este comece a nutrir-se através da placenta. A progesterona suprime a resposta imunitária do útero, o que é necessário para tolerar o embrião, já que este é um tecido estranho para a vaca. Além disso, a progesterona evita as contrações do útero, fecha o colo do útero e modifica as características do muco cervical, tornando-o mais viscoso, impedindo a passagem de agentes estranhos para o interior do útero. Na glândula mamária estimula o desenvolvimento do sistema alveolar, preparando-a para a síntese e a secreção de leite. 5. REGRESSÃO DO CORPO LÚTEO A regressão lútea é um processo ativo ocasionado pela secreção uterina da PGF2α. O mecanismo pelo qual se inicia a síntese e secreção da PGF2α depende de uma interação entre o corpo lúteo, os folículos e o útero. Os estrogênios produzidos no folículo dominante desempenham um papel importante no início da secreção de PGF2α, uma vez que promovem a síntese de receptores para oxitocina. Além disso, os estrogénios estimulam no endométrio a produção da fosfolipase A e da ciclooxigenase; enzimas indispensáveis para a síntese da PGF2α. Durante o ciclo estral, a progesterona inibe a síntese da PGF2α através da supressão da formação de receptores para o estradiol. Após um período de 12 a 14 dias de exposição à progesterona, as células endometriais tornam-se insensíveis à progesterona. Quando isso ocorre, as células endometriais sintetizam receptores para estradiol, permitindo que o estradiol produzido no folículo dominante estimule a síntese de receptores para oxitocina. Neste momento, o endométrio está pronto para sintetizar e secretar PGF2α, em resposta ao estímulo da oxitocina. A primeira secreção de oxitocina é de origem hipotalâmica, o que desencadeia o primeiro pulso de PGF2α. Os seguintes episódios de PGF2α são induzidos pela oxitocina produzida no corpo lúteo. A PGF2α é secretada em episódios (pulsos) com intervalos de seis a oito horas, sendo necessários cinco a seis episódios para a luteólise ocorrer. Se a PGF2α não seguir este padrão de secreção, a regressão do corpo lúteo falhará. Além da PGF2α de origem uterina, o corpo lúteo também produz PGF2α, que aumenta o efeito luteolítico. A falta de sensibilidade à PGF2α observada nos corpos lúteos imaturos (primeiros cinco dias após a ovulação) deve-se ao fato de, neste período, o corpo lúteo ainda não produzir PGF2α (figura 12, 13 e 14). 6. ETAPAS DO CICLO ESTRAL O ciclo estral é dividido em quatro etapas bem definidas. 6.1 Estro Neste estágio a fêmea aceita a cópula ou a monta de outra vaca. O estro é provocado pelo aumento significativo das concentrações de estradiol produzido pelo folículo pré-ovulatório e pela ausência de um corpo lúteo. A duração desta etapa é de 8 a 18 horas. 6.2 Metaestro O metaestro é a etapa posterior ao estro, tem uma duração de quatro a cinco dias. Durante esta etapa ocorre a ovulação e se desenvolve o corpo de lúteo. Após a ovulação, observa-se uma depressão no lugar ocupado pelo folículo ovulatório (depressão ovulatória) e, posteriormente, se desenvolve o corpo hemorrágico (corpo lúteo em processo de formação). Durante o metaestro, as concentrações de progesterona começam a aumentar até atingirem níveis superiores a 1 ng/ml, momento a partir da qual considera-se que o corpo lúteo atingiu a maturidade. O momento em que as concentrações de progesterona são superiores a 1 ng/ml toma-se como critério fisiológico a determinação do fim do metaestro e o início do diestro. Um evento hormonal que se destaca neste período consiste na apresentação do pico pós-ovulatório de FSH, o qual desencadeia a primeira onda de desenvolvimento folicular. Algumas vacas apresentam sangramento conhecido como sangramento metaestral (figura 15). 6.3 Diestro O diestro é o estágio de maior duração do ciclo estral, de 12 a 14 dias. Durante este estágio o corpo lúteo mantém sua plena funcionalidade, o que se reflete em concentrações sanguíneas de progesterona, maiores que 1 ng/ml. Além disso, nesta fase, pode-se encontrar folículos de tamanho diferente devido às ondas foliculares. Após 12-14 dias de exposição à progesterona, o endométrio começa a secretar PGF2α em um padrão pulsátil, ao qual termina com a vida do corpo lúteo e com o diestro. Em termos endócrinos, quando o corpo lúteo perde a sua funcionalidade, ou seja, quando as concentrações de progesterona diminuem abaixo de 1 ng/ml, finaliza-se o diestro e começa o proestro. Convém mencionar que durante esta fase, a LH é secretada com uma frequência muito baixa e a FSH tem incrementos responsáveis pelas ondas foliculares. 6.4 Proestro O proestro caracteriza-se pela ausência de um corpo lúteo funcional e pelo desenvolvimento e maturação do folículo ovulatório. O proestro na vaca dura de dois a três dias. Um evento hormonal característico desta etapa é o aumento da frequência dos pulsos de secreção de LH que levam à maturação final do folículo ovulatório e ao aumento do estradiol sérico, que desencadeia o estro. Para além da classificação do ciclo estral acima descrita, existe outra que divide o ciclo em duas fases: progestacional (lútea) e estrogênica (folicular). A fase progestacional inclui o metaestro e o diestro, e a fase estrogênica ao proestro e estro (figura 16). Figura 16. Etapas do ciclo estral. Adaptado e elaborado a partir de FERREIRA, 2010. 7. CONCLUSÕES PRÉVIAS  O ciclo estral dura de 19 a 23 dias.  A vaca é receptiva durante 8 a 18 horas (estro).  Ao nascimento uma bezerra tem cerca de 200 mil folículos primordiais.  Durante o ciclo estral se apresentam de duas a três ondas foliculares.  De cinco a seis folículos são recrutados em cada onda folicular.  Cerca de 70% das vacas têm duas ondas foliculares e 30% apresentam três ondas.  Entre 10 e 20% das vacas têm ovulações múltiplas (dois a três folículos) e 8% têm partos gêmeos.  A ovulação ocorre 30 horas após o pico pré-ovulatório de LH.  A secreção pré-ovulatória de LH é de 15 a 30 ng/ml.  12 a 14 dias são necessários para que o endométrio se torne insensível à progesterona e comece a secretar PGF2α. - São necessários cinco a seis pulsos de PGF2α com um intervalo de oito horas para ocasionar a luteólise.  O corpo lúteo não é sensível à PGF2α nos primeiros cinco dias do ciclo estral. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE Recife, 2020. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ALVES, Nadja Gomes; PEREIRA, Marcos Neves; COELHO, Rodrigo Michelini. Nutrição e reprodução em vacas leiteiras. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, p. l1248-l1248, 2009. ARBOLEDA, José Leonardo Ruiz; URIBE-VELÁSQUEZ, Luis Fernando; OSORIO, José Henry. Factor de crecimiento semejante a insulina tipo 1 (IGF-1) en la reproducción de la hembra bovina. Vet. zootec, v. 5, n. 2, p. 68-81, 2011. BARUSELLI, Pietro Sampaio; GIMENES, Lindsay Unno; SALES, José Nélio de Sousa. Fisiologia reprodutiva de fêmeas taurinas e zebuínas. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 2, p. 205-211, 2007. COLE, H. H.; CUPPS, P. T. Reproduction in domestic animals. 1ª ed. Londres: Academic Press, 1977. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Características Gerais dos Bovinos/General Characteristics of Cattle Bovine. Disponível em: ———. Acesso em: Fevereiro de 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Definição de Conceitos Básicos na Reprodução Animal: Fertilidade, Fecundidade e Prolificidade-Suínos. Philarchive. Disponível em: ———. Acesso em: Fevereiro de 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: OVULAÇÃO, CONTROLE E SINCRONIZAÇÃO DO CIO. Disponível em: ———. Acesso em: Fevereiro de 2020. DO VALLE, Ezequlel Rodrigues. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. Campo Grande: EMBRAPA-CNPGC, 1991. FERREIRA, A. M. Reprodução da fêmea bovina: fisiologia aplicada e problemas mais comuns. Juiz de Fora: Editar, 2010. GALINA HIDALGO, Carlos et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 1988. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. McDONALD, L.E. Veterinary endocrinology and reproduction. 3.ed. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1980. MELLO, R. R. C. et al. Desenvolvimento folicular inicial em bovinos. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 37, n. 4, p. 328-333, 2013. MELLO, Raquel Rodrigues Costa et al. Aspectos da dinâmica folicular em bovinos. Agropecuária Científica no Semiárido, v. 10, n. 4, p. 01-06, 2015. NEBEL, Ray; DEJARNETTE, M. Anatomía y fisiología de la reproducción bovina. SELECT SIRES INC, v. 6, 2011. PALMA, Gustavo A. Biotecnología de la reproducción. Balcarce: Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria, 2008. PEREIRA, Elias de Oliveira. Fisiologia da reprodução em vacas leiteiras: REVISÃO DE LITERATURA. TCC Medicina Veterinária. Ituverava: FAFRAM, 2019. PETERS, A. R.; BALL, P. J. H. Reprodução em bovinos. São Paulo: Editora Roca, 2006. PRIETO-GÓMEZ, Bertha; VELÁZQUEZ-PANIAGUA, Mireya. Fisiología de la reproducción: hormona liberadora de gonadotrofinas. Rev Fac Med UNAM, v. 45, n. 6, p. 252-57, 2002. SALISBURY, Glenn Wade; LODGE, J. R.; VANDEMARK, N. L. Fisiología de la reproducción e inseminación artificial de los bóvidos. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1978. VIVEIROS, Ana Tereza de Mendonça. Fisiologia da reprodução de bovinos. Lavras: UFLA, 1997. (shrink)

[This is an edited version of a keynote talk at the conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) on November 28, 2022, with some minor additions and subtractions.] -/- There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will break down the strongest reasons for and against. Given mainstream assumptions in the science of consciousness, there are significant obstacles to consciousness in current models: for example, their (...) lack of recurrent processing, a global workspace, and unified agency. At the same time, it is quite possible that these obstacles will be overcome in the next decade or so. I conclude that while it is somewhat unlikely that current large language models are conscious, we should take seriously the possibility that successors to large language models may be conscious in the not-too-distant future. (shrink)

How should we undertand the role of norms—especially epistemic norms—governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability—and so the stability (the continued prevalence)—of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not (...) as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication, for we are animals too, after all; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the present study, we examined how the perceived attainability and relatability of moral exemplars predicted moral elevation and pleasantness among both adult and college student participants. Data collected from two experiments were analyzed with Bayesian multilevel modeling to explore which factors significantly predicted outcome variables at the story level. The analysis results demonstrated that the main effect of perceived relatability and the interaction effect between attainability and relatability shall be included in the best prediction model, and thus, were (...) deemed to predict the outcome variables significantly. The main effect of relatability as well as its interaction with attainability positively predicted elevation and pleasantness. We discussed educational implications of the findings in terms of how relatability may be the first point of emphasis for moral educators to focus on and attainability can then bolster the effectiveness. These relatable and attainable moral exemplars can be sources for moral elevation and pleasantness, which promote motivation to emulate moral behavior presented by the exemplars. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according (...) to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance. (shrink)

The ability to perceive the shapes of things as enduring through changes in how they stimulate our sense organs is vital to our sense of stability in the world. But what sort of capacity is shape constancy, and how is it reflected in perceptual experience? This paper defends a pluralist account of shape constancy: There are multiple kinds of shape constancy centered on geometrical properties at various levels of abstraction, and properties at these various levels feature in the content of (...) perceptual experience, governing patterns of apparent shape similarity. I propose that the varieties of shape constancy are subserved by the syntactic complexity of perceptual shape representations. By assigning discrete constituents to various abstract shape parameters, these representations attune us to the preservation of certain abstract shape properties through changes in more determinate shape properties. Finally, I draw broader lessons concerning the nature and function of perceptual constancy. (shrink)

The received view of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person’s ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to accept a (...) pro-moral luck interpretation of Kant. (shrink)

Public reason liberals expect individuals to have justificatory reasons for their views of certain political issues. This paper considers how groups can, and whether they should, give collective public reasons for their political decisions. A problem is that aggregating individuals’ consistent judgments on reasons and a decision can produce inconsistent collective judgments. The group will then fail to give a reason for its decision. The paper considers various solutions to this problem and defends a deliberative procedure by showing how it (...) incentivizes information sharing and leads to outcomes most acceptable to the group members. (shrink)

This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

How can work be a genuine good in life? I argue that this requires overcoming a problem akin to that studied by Marx scholars as the problem of work, freedom and necessity: how can work be something we genuinely want to do, given that its content is not up to us, but is determined by necessity? I argue that the answer involves valuing contributing to the good of others, typically as valuing active pro-sociality – that is, valuing actively doing something (...) good for others. This makes work better in one way, and may even make work something we are genuinely glad to have in our lives. Contemporary philosophical thinking about good work tends to focus on how work can be good for the person doing it, by providing, for example, self-realization or social relationships, while underappreciating the special importance of valuing social contribution. People will typically only really want work if they want a part of their lives to be about the good of others. This also means that work may be a part of the best life, something we should take into account when discussing work-related policies and the desirability of a ‘post-work’ future. (shrink)

Decisions are made under uncertainty when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and one is uncertain to which the act will lead. Decisions are made under indeterminacy when there are distinct outcomes of a given action, and it is indeterminate to which the act will lead. This paper develops a theory of (synchronic and diachronic) decision-making under indeterminacy that portrays the rational response to such situations as inconstant. Rational agents have to capriciously and randomly choose how to resolve (...) the indeterminacy relevant to a given choice-situation, but such capricious choices once made constrain how they will choose in the future. The account is illustrated by the case of self-interested action in situations where it is indeterminate whether you yourself will survive to benefit or suffer the consequences. The conclusion emphasizes some distinctive anti-hedging predictions of the account. (shrink)

A standard line in the contemporary philosophical literature has it that physical theories are equivalent only when they agree on their empirical content, where this empirical content is often understood as being encoded in the equations of motion of those theories. In this article, we question whether it is indeed the case that the empirical content of a theory is exhausted by its equations of motion, showing that (for example) considerations of boundary conditions play a key role in the empirical (...) equivalence (or otherwise) of theories. Having argued for this, we show that philosophical claims made by Weatherall (2016) that electromagnetism in the Faraday tensor formalism is equivalent to electromagnetism in the vector potential formalism, and by Knox (2011) that general relativity is equivalent to teleparallel gravity, can both be called into question. We then show that properly considering the role of boundary conditions in theory structure can potentially restore these claims of equivalence and close with some remarks on the pragmatics of adjudications on theory identity. (shrink)

According to a number of contemporary theorists, aesthetic reasons can invite or entice us but never compel us. In this paper, I develop a Kantian account of the normative force of aesthetic reasons. While Kant would likely agree that aesthetic reasons do not give rise to obligations, his account nevertheless gives us the resources for explaining how aesthetic reasons can still have more force than merely enticing reasons. This account appeals to the distinct normativity of aesthetic judgments on Kant's theory (...) and the way in which this kind of normativity structures aesthetic exchanges with other judging subjects. I argue that, in addition to the moral reasons we have for appreciating and preserving beauty, Kant’s account can accommodate distinctly aesthetic reasons for doing so that stem from our membership in aesthetic communities. (shrink)

Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view of corporate responsibility by showing how (...) it pays insufficient attention to individual agency. By accounting for group members’ strategic behavior, we shall see how they control collective attitude formation and are therefore responsible for their group’s behavior. (shrink)

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...) Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior (...) belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. (shrink)

Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...) refute the transmission theory, because there is still somebody in a chain of testifiers—the person from whom the creationist teacher acquired what she testifies—who knows the truth of the testified statements. In this paper, we provide a kind of pattern for generating counterexample cases, one that avoids objections discussed by Peter Graham and others in relation to such cases. (shrink)

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.

Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...) the meaning of the truth predicate to be explained by its inferential relation to assertion. We combine this account of the meaning of the truth predicate with a new diagnosis of the Liar Paradox: its derivation requires the truth rules to preserve evidence, but these rules only preserve commitment. The result is a novel inferential deflationist theory of truth, which solves the Liar Paradox in a principled manner. We end by showing that our theory and simple extensions thereof have the resources to axiomatize the internal logic of several supervaluational hierarchies, including Cantini’s. This solves open problems of Halbach (2011) and Horsten (2011). (shrink)

Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1–22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and (...) how we are incentivized to perform these actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to institutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies. We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of the incentivized action view. (shrink)

While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.

Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present, and future. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that, in some sense, the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being so. In this paper, we (...) empirically investigate three claims. First, that people's intuitive or pre-reflective sense that the future is open is at least partly captured by there being truth-gaps for future contingents: what we call alethic openness. Second, that people, perhaps tacitly, believe that the fact that the future is alethically open is a reason to endorse the growing block theory; and third, that part of what explains why people tend to naively represent our world as a growing block is that they represent the future as alethically open. We found evidence in support of the first two claims. We consider the implications of these findings for several debates in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Until recently, philosophers debating the rationality of time-biases have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. First, there is evidence that our third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about whom we know nothing; given access to some information about the preference target, third-person (...) preferences mirror first-person preferences. As a result, the simulation hypothesis has been proposed, according to which third-person preferences will mirror first-person preferences when we can simulate the mental states of the preference target. Second, there is evidence that we prefer negative hedonic events to be in our past (we are first-person negatively hedonically future-biased) only when we view future events as fixed and in no way under our control. By contrast, when we perceive it to be within our power to mitigate the badness of future events, we are first-person negatively hedonically past-biased. This is the mitigation hypothesis. We distinguish two versions of the mitigation hypothesis, the squirrelling version and the heuristic version. We ran a study which tested the simulation hypothesis, and which aimed to determine whether the squirrelling or the heuristic version of the mitigation hypothesis enjoys more empirical support. We found support for the heuristic version of the hypothesis, but no support for the squirrelling version. (shrink)

According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We propose (...) a novel way to resolve this problem. Key to our proposal will be an appreciation of different representational states beholden to truth. We suggest these different representational states are distinguished by how, in the proper governance of these states, the twin goods of attaining truth and avoiding error are weighted. Moreover, we explain how varieties of representational states line up with varieties of cognitive achievement such that knowledge, cum cognitive achievement, must be safe because of the kind of attempt at success that belief is—namely, an attempt that places the premium it does on avoiding error. (shrink)

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory of consciousness (...) (IIT). We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT-restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT-restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system. (shrink)

Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The (...) essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire. (shrink)

Moral perceptualism is the view that perceptual experience is attuned to pick up on moral features in our environment, just as it is attuned to pick up on mundane features of an environment like textures, shapes, colors, pitches, and timbres. One important family of views that incorporate moral perception are those of virtue theorists and sensibility theorists. On these views, one central ability of the virtuous agent is her sensitivity to morally relevant features of situations, where this sensitivity is often (...) spoken of in perceptual terms. However, sensibility theorists have often not been careful to specify how to understand their claims about moral sensibilities as perceptual. In this paper, we distinguish between what we call Attentional Moral Perception and Contentful Moral Perception. We argue that sensibility theorists should endorse Attentional Moral Perception, because it has very powerful empirical evidence in its favor, and it can play all of the explanatory roles that the sensibility theorist needs in her theory of moral sensibilities. (shrink)

While the contemporary philosophical literature is replete with discussion of the control or freedom required for moral responsibility, only more recently has substantial attention been devoted to the knowledge or awareness required, otherwise called the epistemic condition. This area of inquiry is rapidly expanding, as are the various positions within it. This chapter introduces two major positions: the reasonable expectation view and the quality of will view. The chapter then explores two dimensions of the epistemic condition that serve as fault (...) lines along which these two views diverge. The first dimension concerns different kinds of ignorance. The second concerns what agents can be directly blameworthy for. The chapter closes by sketching a novel approach that incorporates advantages of opposing positions on this topic. (shrink)

According to group-agent realism, treating groups as agents with their own intentional states, irreducible to those of the group members, helps us explain and predict the groups’ behavior. This paper challenges this view. When groups judge logically interconnected propositions, group members often have incentives to misrepresent their beliefs of propositions they care less about in order to increase the probability of their groups adopting their view of propositions they consider more important. Aggregating such untruthful judgments may lead to the group (...) forming false beliefs. Treating groups as agents will then not help us explain or predict their behavior. (shrink)

What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no (...) probative value for the development of a semantics for our moral terms. Such judgments can no longer be presumed to put pressure on theories according to which our moral expressions share a semantics with ordinary, descriptive terms. Many rivals to pure, Descriptivist theories count among their advantages the ability to accommodate these judgments. If these judgments have no probative value, such theories lose an important source of support. (shrink)

Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are _in principle_ incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the _prima facie_ appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition _nor_ the extended mind theses are in principle (...) incompatible with two prominent versions of epistemic internalism—viz., accessibilism and mentalism. In fact, one possible diagnosis is that pretheoretical intuitions regarding the incompatibility of active externalism with epistemic internalism are symptomatic of a tacit yet incorrect identification of epistemic internalism with epistemic individualism. Thus, active externalism is not in principle incompatible with epistemic internalism per se and does not significantly restrict one’s options in epistemology. (shrink)

David Lewis is typically interpreted as a class nominalist. One consequence of class nominalism, which he embraced, is that the reduction of ordered pairs, triples, etc to unordered sets of sets is conventional. The reaction by his Australian counterparts D.M. Armstrong and Peter Forrest was that Lewis was not being ontologically serious. This chapter evaluates this debate over serious ontology. It is argued that in one sense Lewis is ontologically serious, but that his additional commitment to structuralism about classes should (...) push him to adopt a trope-theoretic account of naturalness, which opens up another way to respond to the charge of not doing serious ontology. This conclusion is supported by certain remarks he makes in his correspondence, thus revealing how his thinking about properties appears to have evolved from property-egalitarianism to a sparse theory of tropes. (shrink)

Spinoza, le spinozisme et les fondements de la sécularisation est un ouvrage dédié à la mémoire d’Emmanuel Levinas, dont l’auteur a été l’élève durant plusieurs années. Il vise, à travers une analyse d’ordre philosophique, historique, épistémologique et théologique, à mettre au jour les conditions d’émergence interrelatées du spinozisme et de la sécularisation. Pour ce faire, il souligne, entre autres, l’importance des polémiques anti-maimonidiennes, des débats sur les attributs divins, la substance, l’infini, du marranisme et de la Kabbale sur la formation (...) du spinozisme, ainsi que son rapport à la pensée contemporaine. Il mène une recherche interdisciplinaire devant permettre d’éclairer l’origine des difficultés théoriques que ce système philosophique présente. (shrink)

This essay explores the role of God’s omnipresence in Newton’s natural philosophy, with special emphasis placed on how God is related to space. Unlike Descartes’ conception, which denies the spatiality of God, or Gassendi and Charleton’s view, which regards God as completely whole in every part of space, it is argued that Newton accepts spatial extension as a basic aspect of God’s omnipresence. The historical background to Newton’s spatial ontology assumes a large part of our investigation, but with attention also (...) focused on the details of Newton’s unique approach to these traditional Scholastic conceptions. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there would be no obligatory maxims if the only standards for assessing maxims were Kant’s universalizability tests. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first, I clarify my thesis: I define my terms and disambiguate my thesis from other related theses for which one might argue. In the second, I confront the view that says that if a maxim passes the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt that maxim; (...) I also confront a close relative of this view. In the third, I confront the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests, then there is a positive duty to adopt the contradictory of that maxim. In the fourth, I confront two variations of the view that says that if a maxim does not pass the universalizability tests and an agent is deliberating about the action in the maxim, then the agent has a positive duty to adopt the contrary of that maxim. In the fifth, I confront the view that says that if an agent has adopted a maxim of ends, then the agent has a positive duty to universalize that end. I then wrap up the paper with some concluding remarks. (shrink)

This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...) the three. Section 2 then argues that if this is true and micropsychism—the panpsychist view that phenomenal consciousness or its precursors exist at a microphysical level of reality—is also true, then human brains must somehow manipulate fundamental microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes in an analog manner that renders them phenomenally coherent at a macro level. However, Sect. 3 argues that because digital computation abstracts away from microphysical-phenomenal magnitudes—representing cognitive functions non-monotonically in terms of digits—digital computation may be inherently incapable of realizing coherent macroconscious experience. Thus, if panpsychism is true, digital AI may be incapable of achieving phenomenal coherence. Finally, Sect. 4 briefly examines our argument’s implications for Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory theory of consciousness, which we contend may need to be supplanted by a theory of macroconsciousness as analog microphysical-phenomenal information integration. (shrink)

Interpersonal aggregation involves the combining and weighing of benefits and losses to multiple individuals in the course of determining what ought to be done. Most consequentialists embrace thoroughgoing interpersonal aggregation, the view that any large benefit to each of a few people can be morally outweighed by allocating any smaller benefit to each of many others, so long as this second group is sufficiently large. This would permit letting one person die in order to cure some number of mild headaches (...) instead. Most non-consequentialists reject thoroughgoing interpersonal aggregation despite also believing it is permissible to let one person die in order to prevent many cases of paraplegia instead. Non-consequentialists defend this asymmetry largely on the basis of intuition, and some rely on the notion of relevance to formalize the grounding intuitions. This article seeks to clarify and strengthen the non-consequentialist notion of relevance by engaging with three objections to it. (shrink)

The cucumber is a creeping vine that roots in the ground and grows up trellises or other supporting frames, wrapping around supports with thin, spiraling tendrils. The plant may also root in a soilless medium, whereby it will sprawl along the ground in lieu of a supporting structure. The vine has large leaves that form a canopy over the fruits. Among these common diseases, we single out the diseases that affect the cucumber, which is affected by about 22 diseases, with (...) different symptoms for each disease. Today, technology is facilitating human life in all areas of life, and among these facilities are expert systems that have become an integral part of human life as they contain several systems and areas, for example: Artificial Intelligence (AI), which refers to systems or devices that simulate Human intelligence to perform tasks that can improve itself based on some human information, and other areas, and with reference to expert systems and their importance to humans, an integrated expert system has been created in the agricultural field that diagnoses cucumber diseases using CLIPS Expert System language Delphi language. The system was used to design and implement the proposed expert system. The system facilitates the diagnosis of cucumber-related diseases. There is no doubt that this expert system will help farmers and those involved in the agricultural field to diagnose cucumber-related diseases. Objectives: is to help farmers diagnose pear diseases in the correct way and how to treat these diseases. Method: The system contains a program that diagnoses 22 diseases that affect cucumber. Results: The expert system was evaluated by farmers and praised for helping them with it. Conclusion: The expert system for diagnosing cucumber diseases is effective and usable. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Baumann's comments on "Can Knowledge Really be Non-fative?" In this paper Baumann's suggestions for how those who deny the factivty of knowledge might deal with the argument from inconsistency and explosion are addressed.

While Kant was arguably as deeply engaged with the emerging special sciences of his time as he was with Newtonian physics, there is a deep tension in his treatment of these disciplines. On the one hand, Kant endorses a reductionist approach in natural science. On the other hand, Kant is committed to a variety of anti-reductionist positions in empirical psychology, chemistry, and the emerging biological sciences. This chapter examines the precise form that Kant’s anti-reductionism takes in each of these domains (...) and the corresponding set of questions about the extent to which each of these constitutes a genuine science for Kant. (shrink)

This paper is about both an application of virtue ethics, and about virtue ethics itself. A popular application of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to environmental issues is called interpersonal extensionism. It argues that we should view the normative range of traditional interpersonal virtues, such as compassion and humility, as extending beyond our interactions with people to also include our interactions with non-human environments. This paper uncovers an unaddressed problem for this view, then proposes a solution by revising how we understand neo-Aristotelian (...) virtue ethics itself. The tenet in question, defended by virtue ethicists such as Hursthouse and Foot, claims that a character trait counts as a virtue only if it is strictly necessary for human flourishing. This tenet threatens interpersonal extensionism because, as I show, the extended or environment-regarding aspects of virtues such as compassion and humility are not strictly speaking necessary for human flourishing: people can in principle flourish without those. But I then argue that diversities across both people and environments give us good, seldom acknowledged, reasons to revise neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics so that it no longer imposes the tenet that led to this problem. Neither a trait nor an aspect of it need be necessary for human flourishing in order to count as a neo-Aristotelian virtue. Indeed, marked variation between people and between environments can be complementary with respect to flourishing. Sometimes, for instance, part of the reason an environment-regarding aspect of compassion is virtuous is because of its distinct role in creating conditions that increase the chance that others will flourish. To show these things, I draw from work in philosophy of science on cluster approaches to categories and constitution, and from experiences working with diverse people in Canada's diverse national and provincial parks. (shrink)

Much of the philosophical literature on health inequalities seeks to establish the superiority of one or another conception of luck egalitarianism. In recent years, however, an increasing number of self-avowed egalitarian philosophers have proposed replacing luck egalitarianism with alternatives that stress the moral relevance of distinct relationships, rather than the moral relevance of good or bad luck. After briefly explaining why I am not attracted to luck egalitarianism, I seek in this chapter to distinguish and clarify three views that have (...) been characterized in the philosophical literature as forms of relational egalitarianism. I call these three relational views equality of treatment, equality of concern, and social egalitarianism. I will explain why each claims to be a form of egalitarianism and why these three views should not be seen as competitors. I will argue that each brand of relational egalitarianism describes a plausible plank of distributive justice that bears on the evaluation of health inequalities and on the political institutions that create, sustain, or exacerbate them. To illustrate this pluralistic relational egalitarian approach, I will draw on a case study by Horton and Barker (this volume) to discuss how each of the three planks might be brought to bear on the evaluation of oral health disparities among the children of migrant Latino farmworkers in California. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, many philosophers in America thought that time should be taken seriously in one way or another. George P. Adams (1882-1961) argued that the past, present and future are all real but only the present is actual. I call this theory ‘actualist eternalism’. In this paper, I articulate his novel brand of eternalism as one piece of his metaphysical system and I explain how he argued for the view in light of the best explanations of temporal (...) experience and the present. I argue that his exploitation of analogies between time and modality offer some lessons for current debates about time such as the importance of providing a temporal epistemology. I also extract what I call the temporal boundary problem and argue that it gives rise to an unaddressed challenge for presentists and growing block theorists. (shrink)

Various approaches have emerged over the last several decades to meet the challenges and complexities of anticipating and responding to the potential impacts of emerging technologies. Although many of the existing approaches share similarities, they each have shortfalls. This paper takes as the object of its study Anticipatory Ethics for Emerging Technologies (ATE) to technology assessment, given that it was formatted to address many of the privations characterising parallel approaches. The ATE approach, also in practice, presents certain areas for retooling, (...) such as how it characterises levels and objects of analysis. This paper results from the work done with the TechEthos Horizon 2020 project in evaluating the ethical, legal, and social impacts of climate engineering, digital extended reality, and neurotechnologies. To meet the challenges these technology families present, this paper aims to enhance the ATE framework to encompass the variety of human processes and material forms, functions, and applications that comprise the socio-technical systems in which these technologies are embedded. (shrink)

In this paper we present two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for one who aspires to defend some plausible version of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle involves an application of contextualism in epistemology; and the second puzzle concerns the task of defending a plausible version of the precautionary principle that would not be invalidated by de minimis.

This paper presents a novel account of focal stress and pitch contour in English dialogue. We argue that one should analyse and treat focus and pitch contour jointly, since (i) some pragmatic interpretations vary with contour (e.g., whether an utterance accepts or rejects; or whether it implicates a positive or negative answer); and (ii) there are utterances with identical prosodic focus that in the same context are infelicitous with one contour, but felicitous with another. We offer an account of two (...) distinct pitch contours that predicts the correct felicity judgements and implicatures, outclassing other models in empirical coverage or formality. Prosodic focus triggers a presupposition, where what is presupposed and how the presupposition is resolved depends on prosodic contour. If resolving the presupposition entails the proffered content, then the proffered content is uninteresting and hence the utterance is in-felicitous. Otherwise, resolving the presupposition may lead to an implicature. We regiment this account in SDRT. (shrink)